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Abstract 
 
The question of what explains variation in expenditures on Active Labour 
Market Programs (ALMPs) has attracted significant scholarship in recent years. 
Significant insights have been gained with respect to the role of employers, unions 
and dual labour markets, openness, and partisanship. However, there remain 
significant disagreements with respects to key explanatory variables such the role of 
unions or the impact of partisanship.  
 
Qualitative studies have shown that there are both good conceptual reasons as 
well as historical evidence that different ALMPs are driven by different dynamics. 
There is little reason to believe that vastly different programs such as training and 
employment subsidies are driven by similar structural, interest group or indeed 
partisan dynamics. The question is therefore whether different ALMPs have the 
same correlation with different key explanatory variables identified in the literature?  
Using regression analysis, this paper shows that the explanatory variables identified 
by the literature have different relation to distinct ALMPs. This refinement adds 
significant analytical value and shows that disagreements are at least partly due to a 
dependent variable problem of „over-aggregation‟.  
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Introduction1 
 
The question of what drives welfare state changes and policies has interested scholars for 
some time now. This paper aims to contribute to this debate by looking at the determinants 
of Active Labour Market Policies (ALMPs). ALMPs are policies financed by the government 
with the purpose of reducing unemployment and include spending on programs such as 
training, employment subsidies and public employment services. This focus is relevant for at 
least three reasons.  
 
First, labour markets are political arenas par excellence given their importance for labour, 
capital and governments. Second, the activation paradigm2 in which these policies are 
embedded has gained particular importance in European Member States‟ reform agenda. This 
is particularly obvious in the increased prescriptive emphasis that international organisations 
such as the European Union (EU) and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) have put on activation, but also empirically as many EU countries 
have implemented activation reforms in their labour market policies. Third, not surprisingly 
given the previous two reasons, a growing and substantial literature has looked at the 
determinants of ALMPs.  
 
This is especially clear with respect to the literature undertaking quantitative analyses. 
While in the 1990s, only Boix (1998) and Janoski and Hicks (1994) analysed quantitatively the 
determinants of ALMPs, the 2000s were marked by a growing number of studies (Martin and 
Swank 2004; Rueda 2006; Rueda 2007; Swank 2007; Huo, Nelson et al. 2008; Van Vliet and 
Koster 2008). Yet, as Bonoli (2008: abstract) notes: “we seem to be far from a satisfactory 
account of the determinants of active labour market policy”. 
 
A major point of disagreement surrounds the question of whether left parties are 
positively related to ALMPs, as these are presumed to favour labour, or whether left parties 
only represent the interests of insiders, not outsiders, and hence will not support ALMPs, 
unless certain conditions are met, such as low employment protection or inclusive unions. 
The conditions under which trade unions will support ALMPs (Nelson, 2006), and whether 
this support will translate in higher spending, are similarly contested. Despite the diversity of 
approaches, these studies share the shortcoming that they rely on an indicator which is too 
broad and hence incorporates theoretically and empirically distinct dynamics. Indeed, there is 
little reason to presume that training, spending on public employment services, and 
employment subsidies, to name but three types of programs classified as ALMPs, are driven 
by similar dynamics.  
 
The research question of this paper is therefore twofold. First, do different ALMPs have 
the same empirical relations with different key explanatory variables identified in the 
literature?  Second, if the answer to this empirical question is no, what then are the theoretical 
implications of these different relationships? In light of the qualitative literature and the 
existing conflicting results in the large N literature, the expectation is that different ALMPs 
have different relationships with the main determinants that the literature has identified. This 
paper therefore argues that it is problematic to use aggregate ALMPs as a dependent variable 
in quantitative studies. There are no clear prior expectations with respect to the determinants 
of specific ALMPs. Hence, with respect to the second question this paper proceeds 
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inductively with the aim, where possible, to reconcile the disagreements of the existing 
literature.  
 
The next section reviews the literature relying on quantitative methods. Section III shows 
that qualitative studies indicate different types of ALMPs are driven by different dynamics. 
The fourth section starts by undertaking descriptive empirical analysis of different ALMPs. 
Different regression methods are then employed to establish the relation between different 
ALMPs and the main explanatory variables identified in the existing literature. Before 
concluding, the results of the regression analysis are discussed and some theoretical 
implications are identified.  
 
 
Quantitative literature review 
 
Quantitative studies of the determinants of ALMPs share similar approaches (most often 
panel data regressions analysis) regressing aggregate spending on ALMPs as a percentage of 
GDP or total labour market expenditures, sometimes weighted with a proxy for the 
unemployment level. Table 1 briefly summarises the quantitative effects of different 
determinants on the spending levels of ALMPs that have been identified by the literature3. 
One can observe quite important differences concerning the impact of key variables for 
theories of what drives welfare state change: (A) Partisanship, (B) Trade unions and 
coordination, and (C) Openness, europeanization, and deindustrialisation. 
 
A: Partisanship 
 
The debate has been centred particularly strongly on the role of partisanship, where the 
latter is often operationalised in line with earlier literature (Huber and Stephens 2001) by 
calculating the cabinet share of different parties, though other authors (for instance: Bonoli 
2008) have relied on parliamentary representation.  On the one hand, authors find that 
spending on ALMPs is positively influenced by the presence of social democratic and left 
wing parties in government (Boix 1998; Swank and Martin 2001; Swank 2007; Huo, Nelson et 
al. 2008). The idea is that social democratic parties‟ traditional concern for employment 
implies that they would embrace activation insofar as it promotes employment and hence the 
interests of labour. The prototypical illustration of this is the active labour market policy 
undertaken by Sweden under social democratic rule (Esping-Andersen 1990). From this 
perspective, other left leanings actors such as unions are also expected to support these 
expenditures on activation programs as this strengthens unions‟ bargaining strength through 
lower unemployment.  
 
On the other hand,  partisanship is not found to be significant in a number of studies (for 
instance: Gaston and Rajaguru 2008; Dahlström, Lindvall et al. 2009) and Bonoli (2008) finds 
left parties to have a negative significant effect on ALMPs, while the coefficient on the 
interaction variable between openness and left parties is positive. Similarly, Rueda (2007) finds 
that activation spending is not (or negatively) affected by social democratic parties. The 
argument is that labour is not homogenous and can be divided into labour market insiders 
(those with regular full time employment) and outsiders (the unemployed and workers in 
involuntary part time and temporary employment). In this theory, the interests of these two 
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groups are different because “insiders care about their own employment protection much 
more than about labour market policies aimed at promoting the interests of outsiders” (ibid: 
212). Social democratic parties are concerned only about insiders as their core constituency 
and not about ALMPs‟ main target group (i.e.: outsiders). As a result, they are either neutral 
or opposed to activation, except where employment protection of insiders is low, thereby 
making insiders more like outsiders. 
 
If left wing parties do not promote ALMPs, then that begs the question of who is 
promoting it? The impact of right wing parties in government is similarly contested: Franzese 
and Hays (2006) find that Christian democratic parties have no significant effect, Dahstrom et 
al (2009) and Bonoli (2008) find a significant positive effect, and Swank and Martin (2010) a 
negative effect. It is not clear theoretically why right wing parties should themselves be 
preoccupied with the interests of labour market outsiders which are not one of their core 
constituencies. 
 
B: Trade unions and coordination 
 
Trade unions are found to be positively related to ALMPs in a number of studies (Rueda 
2006; Gaston and Rajaguru 2008; Dahlström, Lindvall et al. 2009; Traxler and Brandl 2009). 
The expectation that unions would support ALMPs stems partly from their traditional 
position towards social policies that expand the welfare state‟s reach. However, union‟s 
support can occur for quite different reasons and through different causal mechanisms: they 
could do so because it favours labour in line with classic power resource theory (Korpi 1978), 
because it allows them to extend their membership base (Clegg, Graziano et al. 2010), because 
there are many labour market outsiders in unions as a result of high union density or because 
insiders are more like outsiders when employment protection legislation is low (Rueda 2007). 
In line with this latter purported mechanism, employment protection for regular workers is 
found to have a negative effect.  
 
Union support for ALMPs may itself be conditional on other factors. For instance, 
Nelson (2009: 230) finds that support “increase in contexts of rapid deindustrialization and 
low employment protection” and decreases with “high unemployment”. Support is also likely 
to be higher where “union membership is more encompassing” (Nelson 2006: 1).  Moreover, 
in their model Franzese and Hays (2006) do not find union density to have a significant 
effect, and Rueda (2007) similarly does not find a positive significant relationship. One 
explanation has underscored the possibility that unions may not have incentives to support 
ALMPs. Non-working labour market outsiders have much smaller unionisation rates than 
workers in employment (Ebbinghaus 2006) . Given their overall tendency to be under 
represented among unions, they will only be represented insofar as it does not adversely affect 
insiders‟ interests. But this is unlikely to be the case. As Rueda (2007: 26) argues, to the extent 
that ALMPs are funded out of taxes that fall on insiders and may increase labour market 
competition, insiders may oppose ALMPs. 
 
More generally, it is also possible to analyse the effect of the structure in which unions 
operate. For instance, the degree of coordination, using a number of different measures, is 
found to be positively associated with ALMPs, though there is some variation in the type of 
coordination which is found to be significant. Swank‟s results (2007) identify only sector 
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coordination as significant, not national coordination. Van Vliet and Koster (2008) finds a 
significant coefficient for tripartite council significant, while for Dahlstrom et al (2009) finds 
that bargaining coordination has a positive significant effect and Traxler and Brandl‟s (2009) 
results confirm this. Only Rueda‟s results for coordination are not significant (Rueda 2006; 
2007). Last, employers‟ influence, especially as measured by their degree of organisation, has a 
positive significant effect on ALMPs expenditures (Swank and Martin 2001; and 2004). 
 
C: Openness and Europeanization, or Deindustrialisation? 
 
Openness has most often a positive effect on ALMPs, but three studies find it to have no 
significant effect (Gaston and Rajaguru 2008; Huo, Nelson et al. 2008; Van Vliet and Koster 
2008) and one article finds a negative effect (Martin and Swank 2004). The positive effect is 
consistent with the notion that ALMPs can be used to ensure the adaptability of labour 
markets to the pressures that openness imposes on the level of competitiveness of countries 
(Katzenstein 1985) and with the seminal findings of Cameron (1978: 71) which pointed to the 
fact that “nations with open economies were far more likely to experience an increase in the 
scope of public funding”. More recently, Garrett (1995; 1998) and Rodrik (1998) have also 
shown that higher levels of openness increase the size of the welfare state because 
“government spending plays a risk-reducing role in economies exposed to a significant 
amount of external risk (Rodrik 1998: 997). 
 
Studies that have looked at EU dynamics find that EU membership has a positive effect 
while European Monetary Union (EMU) membership has a negative effect on ALMPs 
(Armingeon 2005 and 2007; Swank 2007; Van Vliet and Koster 2008). More specifically, the 
European Employment Strategy is positively related to a stronger emphasis on ALMPs as 
percentage of total labour market spending in EU member states (Van Vliet and Koster 2008: 
17) either because of learning between European policy makers or as result of the effect of 
recommendations (De la Porte and Nanz 2003; Zeitlin and Pochet 2005), while membership 
in EMU may constrain budget thereby affecting expenditures on ALMPs (ibid: 18). 
 
That openness is a driving force behind the expansion of the welfare state has also been 
contested on the basis that it is deindustrialisation that is the most relevant explanatory factor 
for aggregate spending on the welfare state (Iversen and Cusack, 1998). Deindustrialisation is 
found to have a significant positive effect in the three out of four studies where it is 
considered (Martin and Swank 2004; Franzese and Hays 2006; Swank 2007)4. In one case 
(Swank and Martin 2010: table 7), it is significant as an interaction effect with employers‟ 
organisations but not on its own. This is consistent with the earlier finding that 
“deindustrialization poses significant risks that can be addressed only through government 
expansion of social security” (Iversen and Cusack 1998: 346) as deindustrialisation “should 
mean that service sector firms have a greater need for training than manufacturing firms” 
(Martin and Swank 2004: 597). 
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Qualitative literature review 
 
Thus, what drives activation spending remains an open question from an empirical (large 
N) perspective. Partly this may result from a false premise concerning the presumed 
effectiveness of the programs, whereas a number of ALMPs are actually unable to reduce 
unemployment (Martin and Grubb 2001) and the evidence has been contested (Calmfors, 
Forslund et al. 2001).   
 
This points to the possibility that ALMPs as a category is too broad which makes “it 
difficult to use the notion of ALMPs as an analytical tool” (Bonoli 2010: 22). Using as a 
dependent variables aggregate spending on ALMPs may put together programs which are 
sufficiently heterogeneous to be expected to be driven by different dynamics. This 
expectation is based on the historical evidence concerning the drivers of different ALMPs. 
 
Earlier work, most notably the welfare regime typologies pioneered by Esping-Andersen 
(1990), had shown why the power of the labour movement and their political representatives 
were able in social democratic Scandinavia to develop effective ALMPs. This was 
instrumental in promoting one of labour‟s key objectives such as minimising unemployment 
and achieving full employment. The notion that labour was the only or indeed the main 
driving force behind these developments has been contested by Swenson (1991: 542, 543; and 
Swenson 2002): “The cross-class political realignment that brought Social Democrats in 
Denmark and Sweden to power … included sub political alliances of union and employer 
groups behind centralized control of industrial relations and the intersectoral structure of 
pay.“ 
 
However, qualitative contributions have also underscored the notion that there are 
different worlds or types of activation of labour market policies (Torfing 1999; Barbier 2001; 
Barbier and Ludwig-Mayerhofer 2004; Taylor-Gooby 2004) and that activation may not be a 
homogenous process. These authors share a common argument that activation at the very 
least entails two types of processes, if not more. Bonoli (2010: 440 and 441) goes further and 
distinguishes four types of activation: “incentive reinforcement” includes “measures that aim 
to strengthen work incentives for benefit recipients”,  “employment assistance” refers to 
“measures aimed at removing obstacles to labor-market participation”, “occupation” aims to 
”keep jobless people busy, to prevent the depletion of human capital associated with an 
unemployment spell” and “upskilling” consists of “vocational training”.  
 
He then operationalizes the latter three measures (i.e.: employment assistance, 
occupation, and upskilling) using OECD data for six European countries: Denmark, Sweden, 
Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Italy. The evolution of policies are analysed 
across three periods of time: the postwar years (from the 1950s to the 1970s), ALMPs in the 
context of mass unemployment (from the 1970s to the early 1990s) and the “activation turn” 
(since the mid-1990s). The evidence suggests that different actors support different measures. 
As Bonoli (2010: 452) concludes: “there is little regularity across time and space of the 
political forces that are behind major ALMP initiatives”. For instance, investment in human 
capital was supported by both Christian and social democrats while liberal as well as 
Conservative parties emphasised the reinforcement of incentives.  
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Hence, while a given actor, such as unions, may support certain measures such as 
training, they may oppose the introduction of other measures, for instance employment 
incentives. If both are included under the same spending figure, this may lead to spurious 
associations between activation spending and explanatory variables. In sum, there are both 
empirical (diverse results in the literature) as well as historical reasons to doubt that all 
ALMPs are driven by similar dynamics. The next section proceeds with an empirical analysis 
of the dependent and independent variables. 
 
 
Empirical analysis 
 
The OECD statistics website provides disaggregated data on spending on seven types of 
ALMPs: (1) public employment services and administration (placement and related services, 
benefit administration); (2) training (institutional training, workplace training, integrated 
training, special support for apprenticeship); (3) job rotation and job sharing; (4) employment 
incentives (recruitment incentives and employment maintenance incentives); (5) supported 
employment and rehabilitation; (6) direct job creation; and (7) start up incentives. This 
categorisation follows from the new classification as introduced by Eurostat in 1998 which 
the OECD has decided to take up from 2002 onwards (Grubb and Puymoyen 2008).5 
Throughout, I rely on a sample of fifteen European countries (i.e.: EU15 minus 
Luxembourg plus Norway) over the period 1985 to 2007, though data availability varies 
depending on variables and countries. In this section I focus on categories (1), (2), (4), (5) and 
(6) for reasons of parsimony, but also because category (3) relates to maintaining people in 
jobs and has limited data availability while category (7) promotes self-employment rather than 
dependent employment. This section first undertakes basic correlation analysis to show how 
the dependent variables relate to one another and their degree of correlation with key 
explanatory variables. Then, it presents the basic regression model and estimation strategy 
before discussing the results. 
 
A: Correlation analysis 
 
As shown in Table 2, some of these variables are indeed correlated. For instance, 
spending on employment incentives and training has a significant positive correlation equal to 
0.51 while spending on employment incentives and supported employment and rehabilitation 
have a significant positive correlation coefficient of 0.29. The highest significant correlation is 
between Public Employment Services (PES) and supported rehabilitation (0.73). However, 
employment incentives and direct job creation have a non-significant coefficient of a small 
magnitude (0.07). Employment incentives similarly have a very low non-significant correlation 
with PES (0.0031). While the correlation between direct job creation and supported 
rehabilitation is significant, the coefficient is low at about 0.09. It is therefore very unlikely 
that direct job creation is driven by similar dynamics as employment incentives and supported 
rehabilitation, or that PES shares the same determinants as supported rehabilitation. 
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 Training 
Employment 
incentives 
Supported 
rehabilitation 
Direct job 
creation 
Public 
Employment 
services 
Training 1 0.5198*** 0.2967*** 0.2214*** 0.1380** 
Employment incentives 0.5198*** 1 0.2994*** 0.0763 0.0031 
Supported rehabilitation 0.2967*** 0.2994*** 1 0.0926** 0.7336*** 
Direct job creation 0.2214*** 0.0763 0.0926** 1 0.1939*** 
Public Employment 
Services 
0.1380** 0.0031 0.7336*** 0.1939*** 1 
 
Table 2: Correlation between various ALMPs 
Note:  * p<.1; **p<.05; *** p<.01 
 
 
 
ALMPs / 
determinants 
ALMPs Training 
Employm. 
incentives 
Supported 
rehabilitation 
Direct job 
creation 
Public 
Employment 
services 
Deindustrialisation 0.4758*** 0.2251*** 0.2322** 0.4758*** 0.2306*** 0.5172*** 
Deficit -0.0013*** -0.0164 -0.0091 0.0558 -0.0075 -0.0447 
Openness 0.2583*** -0.0342 -0.0603 0.3285*** 0.4628*** 0.3708*** 
Harmonised 
unemployment 
-0.0260 0.0058 -0.0409 -0.3541*** -0.1714*** -0.1543*** 
Union density 0.4860*** 0.5167*** 0.4667*** 0.2540*** 0.2048*** -0.0346 
Party in power 0.0266*** 0.0137 0.0681 -0.0301 -0.0745 0.0161 
 
Table 3: Introducing previous explanations on disaggregated data  
Note:  * p<.1; **p<.05; *** p<.01 
 
 
Table 3 considers the correlation coefficients between these five ALMPs and the 
determinants identified in the literature, where they are defined as follows. Deindustrialisation 
is proxied by the usual formula as 100 minus the share of employees in services and 
agriculture (Iversen and Cusack 1998). Deficits are expressed as a percentage of GDP. 
Following other authors (for instance: Martin and Swank 2004; Bonoli 2008), openness has 
been computed as the sum of exports and imports divided by the GDP. Harmonised 
unemployment comprises the number of unemployed people as a percentage of the civilian 
labour force. Union density refers to net union membership as a proportion of wage and 
salary earners in employment. Last, party in power is an updated version of the Schmidt index 
which calculates the composition of the Cabinet composition. The coding is from (1) 
hegemony of right-wing (and centre) parties (gov_left=0) through to (5) hegemony of social-
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democratic and other left parties (gov_left=100), which is taken from the comparative 
political dataset (Armingeon, Gerger et al. 2008). 
 
Looking at the results of the correlation analysis, a number of determinants have 
correlation coefficients with similar signs but rarely with the same magnitude. 
Deindustrialisation is significantly and positively correlated with all measures, and the 
correlation is particularly strong for supported rehabilitation (0.47) and PES (0.5172) but not 
for the other measures (around 0.2). Union density has a consistent significant positive 
correlation with all types of ALMPs, except for PES, but the range varies from 0.51 in the 
case of training to 0.20 in the case of direct job creation, suggesting that the importance of 
unions‟ membership varies between different programs. Partisanship (left parties in 
government) is not significantly correlated with any of the ALMPs under consideration, 
though the aggregate measure of ALMPs is significantly correlated with partisanship.  
 
Moreover, variables identified in the literature have correlation coefficients which signs 
differ depending on the measure under consideration. For instance, deficit is not significantly 
correlated with the variables under consideration; and while the correlation is positive for 
supported rehabilitation, it is negative for the other variables. Openness has a significant 
positive impact on job creation and supported rehabilitation but negative and non-significant 
correlations with training and employment incentives. Harmonised unemployment has a non-
significant positive correlation with training and employment incentives, but is negatively 
correlated with direct job creation. One could argue however that these apparent differences 
between the determinants of different programs are a result of the rather crude correlation 
analysis and that should one take a more sophisticated approach with the appropriate 
controls, this would not be the case. Thus, we now turn to regression analysis. 
 
B: The model  
 
As in the previous correlation analysis the sample covers 15 European countries in the 
period 1985 to 2007 which, given certain missing observations in my dataset, results in about 
230 observations. The dependent variables throughout the analysis are disaggregated ALMPs 
data expressed as a percentage of GDP. Panel data regression analysis of five dependent 
variables is used to investigate whether the previously identified explanatory variables have 
consistently different effects on spending on different programs. The regression model that is 
tested is as follows: 
yk,it = β0 +  ∑j βj xj,it + ∑p γp zp,it + δi + αt + εi,t  
where yk,it is the dependent variable k in country i at time t, the x‟s are j explanatory 
variables, the z‟s are p controls, the δi are n-1 country specific effects, the αt‟s are t-1 year 
dummies6 and εi,t is the random residual. The dependent variable concerns the specific 
ALMPs under consideration expressed as a percentage of GDP.  
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More specifically, the vector of explanatory variables is the following: 
∑j βj xj,it = β1 OPENi,t + β2 DEINDi,t + β3 GOVPARTYi,t + β4 DENi,t + β5 WCOORDi,t + β6 EPLi,t 
where OPEN is the degree of openness, DEIND is deindustrialisation, DEN the union 
density, GOVPARTY the measure of partisanship, all defined as in the previous section. 
Recall that the variable „govparty‟ is coded from 1, where there is hegemony of right wing 
parties in government, through to 5 where there is hegemony of social democratic and other 
left parties in government. Thus, a negative coefficient means that there is an inverse 
relationship between left parties and the dependent variable. Thus, these variables are selected 
because there are key explanatory variables that the existing literature has analysed. The 
variable WCOORD stands for the degree of wage coordination and is coded from 1 which 
corresponds to fragmented (mostly at company) bargaining to 5 which stands for economy-
wide bargaining, based on enforceable agreements between the central organisations (See the 
variable description of Armingeon, Gerger et al. 2008 for more details on these variables). 
The variable EPL is the overall index of Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) developed 
by the OECD, which was used by Rueda (2007) when investigating empirically his insider-
outsider model. Last but not least, note that Europeanization that was discussed in part 2 of 
the paper is not included in this analysis on disaggregated data. This is because the sample is 
restricted almost exclusively to EU countries and hence is not appropriate to draw inferences 
concerning the effect of EU membership. 
  
The vector of control variables includes: ∑p γp zp,it = γ1 GDPi,t + γ2 HUi,t + γ3 DEFi,t  
where GDP is GDP growth and is included because higher growth of GDP may affect both 
the cyclical and the discretionary component of policies; HU is harmonised unemployment 
which controls for the level of unemployment that ALMPs are supposed to address and DEF 
is the deficit as a percentage of GDP, which captures the constraints on budget that 
governments face.  
 
As my dependent variables are time series expressed in levels, it is necessary to test for 
stationarity. Indeed, if both the dependent and the independent variables are non-stationary, 
then regression analysis may yield spurious results (Gujarati 2003). When including a trend, 
the null hypothesis is rejected for all dependent variables except direct job creation. With 
respect to the independent variables, including a time trend does not remove non-stationarity 
for the unemployment rate, union density and deindustrialisation. Thus, these three variables 
may become spuriously related to direct job creation as they both are non-stationary. As a 
result, particular attention will be paid to the regression with direct job creation, and first 
difference will also be calculated to ensure the results are not driven by non-stationarity. Last 
but not least, a Hausman test confirmed that random effects should be used to estimate this 
model (Hausman 1978) as the null hypothesis that random effects and fixed effects 
coefficients are the same is not rejected. 
 
C: Estimation strategy 
 
I first run a general model using the Feasible Generalised Least Square (FGLS) regression 
method with fixed effects, year dummies and a trend. Results are reported in Table 4. This 
allows me to further confirm whether random effects should be used and to carry out tests on 
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the residuals. Different columns represent regressions using the same method on the same 
data but using a different dependent variable. Unless specified otherwise, the dependent 
variables are expressed in levels of expenditures as a percentage of GDP.  
 
 
 
Table 4: Feasible Generalised Least Squares on different active measures as % of GDP 
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This operationalization of the dependent variables is warranted on theoretical grounds, 
namely that we are interested in explaining the differences in levels across time and space, not 
in explaining the change in the dependent variables per se. Although the Hausman test 
suggested we should use fixed effects, tests for country dummies showed that they were 
significant with all dependent variables. This is not the case for all time dummies which 
inclusion is more justified with some dependent variables than others. Thus, we will also 
compare the results for fixed effects and random effects to investigate whether our results 
that the dependent variables are driven by different dynamics hold under all specifications. 
Analysing Table 4 reveals that few explanatory variables are significant across regressions 
with different ALMPs. Deficit is the only case where this occurs, but this is hardly instructive 
as it is more appropriately conceived as a control variable. Wage coordination has a significant 
coefficient in all cases except for spending on Public Employment Services (PES). Even in 
this case, the size of the coefficient varies by a factor of four. The coefficient for GDP 
growth is not significant and varies in sign. Union density is not significant for employment 
incentives or supported rehabilitation while the presence of left wing parties in government, 
as shown by the coefficient for the “govparty” variable, has a significant negative correlation 
with these two dependent variables, and is significantly positively related to spending on PES. 
Similar variation in size, significance and direction of effects can be observed for the 
remaining independent variables. Deindustrialisation is only significant for direct job creation 
and the sign varies. Openness has a negative impact throughout but significance is only 
warranted for the case of PES. Harmonised unemployment is also only significant for PES 
and the sign varies again. Last but not least, none of the coefficients for overall EPL are 
significant and the sign varies depending on the dependent variable under consideration. 
The Likelihood Ratio test of heteroskedasticity and Woodridge test for autocorrelation 
(Wooldridge 2002; Drukker 2003) revealed that the residuals using FGLS were both 
heteroskedastic and autocorrelated thereby violating the assumptions of spherical 
disturbances. This could mean that the different results for different dependent variables may 
be the result of violations of the assumptions on which the estimation procedure relies.  
 
To address this issue, and following Beck (2001) as well as Beck and Katz (1995), I 
estimate the same models with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Panel Corrected Standard 
Errors (PCSE) which compute “variance–covariance matrices for panel data corrected for 
heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation” (Martin and Swank 2004: 600). Given 
significant resilience in the evolution of my dependent variable, I also include a lagged 
dependent variable as well as a trend to capture trend effects. As the previous results were 
ambiguous with respect to model specification of fixed versus random effects, where the 
outcome of the Hausman test differed from the test of country dummies‟ significance, both 
random and fixed effects are run. Table 5 reports these results: there are non-trivial 
differences between the two specifications but in both cases the results differ for different 
dependent variables.  
 
There are four potential problems with the „Beck Katz standard‟: “absorption of cross-
sectional variance by unit dummies, absorption of time-series variance by the lagged 
dependent variable and period dummies, mis-specification of the lag structure, and neglect of 
parameter slope heterogeneity” (Plumper, Troeger et al. 2005: 327). As an alternative, one 
should rely on “Prais-Winsten transformation rather than the lagged dependent variable to 
eliminate serial correlation of errors” (ibid: 349). Thus, to ensure that autocorrelation is 
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addressed, an Autocorrelation process of order 1 (AR1) was added to all the regressions. This 
estimation strategy therefore addresses both within and between panel correlations. The 
results for both fixed and random effects specifications of this estimation procedure are 
reported in Table 6: again there are important differences in the results for each dependent 
variable.  
 
Panel Corrected Standard Errors assumes that “the disturbances are, by default, 
heteroskedastic and contemporaneously correlated across panels” (Stata 2010). If in fact 
different panels are independent and the observations within the panels are not, then one 
should run a regression with robust cluster standard errors, which is appropriate when 
“observations within cluster may not be treated as independent, but the clusters themselves 
are independent” (Gutierrez and Drukker 2003). In addition, regressions relying on robust 
cluster standard errors produce more unforgiving standard errors. Results for OLS 
regressions with robust clustered standard errors (Rogers 1993; Williams 2000) and random 
effects can be found in Table 7. 
 
Another potential issue with my approach is that so far I have only shown that level effects 
vary for different dependent variables, whereas some authors in the literature are interested in 
change effects. In addition, this ensures that the differences in the significant of the explanatory 
variables are not driven by issues of non-stationarity identified earlier. Thus, I also ran OLS 
regressions with PCSE taking the first difference of all my variables to look at the impact of a 
change in the independent variables on the change in my dependent variables. The results for 
this approach are shown in Table 8. Again there is a non-trivial variation in the significance 
and signs of the coefficients. Given the diversity of results depending on different 
specifications, this raises the question of what these results imply, which we address in the 
next sub-section. 
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Table 7: Robust cluster with random effects and a trend 
Note: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: OLS PCSE on the first difference of ALMPs  
Note: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. 
 
Dependent variables Δ (Training / GDP)
Δ (Employment 
Incentives / GDP)
Δ (Employment 
Rehabilitation / 
GDP)
Δ (Direct Job 
Creation / GDP)
Δ (Public 
Employment 
Services / GDP)
Inpendent variables
Δ Openness -0.0000279 -0.0004383 -0.0001861 -0.0011089*** -0.0007371***
Δ Deindustrialisation -0.0023811 -0.0024044 0.0005413 -0.0005606 0.0018451**
Δ Left government 0.0017307 -0.0066131*** -0.0008754 -0.0009167 0.0012798**
Δ Union density -0.0006216 -0.0030746* 0.0005157 0.0005275 0.0010135
Δ Wage coordination 0.0221641 0.0417579*** 0.0085754* 0.0091327 0.0060742***
Δ Employment Protection 0.0173676 0.0288111** 0.009211** -0.0008372 -0.0073052
Controls
GDP growth 0.0000264 -0.0015281 -0.0009716 -0.0035841* -0.001066
Δ Deficit -0.0005577 0.0007745 -0.0001065 -0.001333 -0.0007007*
Δ Harmonised unemployment -0.0027822 0.005562*** 0.00000848 -0.0003913 -0.0006698
Specification
Trend no no no no no
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.0392089 0.0303461 0.0250918 0.2775653*** -0.1163971**
Time Dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Country Dummies yes yes yes yes yes
R-Squared 0.1422 0.2731 0.2844 0.3095 0.2161
Observations 257 260 260 260 236
Legend:  * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
Dependent variables Training / GDP
Employment 
Incentives / GDP
Employment 
Rehabilitation / 
GDP
Direct Job 
Creation / GDP
Public 
Employment 
Services / GDP
Inpendent variables
Openness -0.0025** -0.0003 0.0012 0.0023** 0.0012
Deindustrialisation 0.0053 0.0038 0.0125** 0.0073* 0.0068**
Left government -0.0064 -0.0005 -0.0039 -0.0011 0.0051
Union density 0.0046*** 0.0044* 0.0012 0.0002 -0.0008
Wage coordination 0.0610** -0.0004 0.0066 0.0376** -0.0012
Employment Protection 0.0028 0.0554* 0.0507* 0.0234 -0.0071
Controls
GDP growth 0.0122 0.0039 -0.0057 0.0022 -0.0048
Deficit -0.0113*** -0.0112 -0.0077* -0.0084* -0.0082**
Harmonised unemployment -0.0022 0.0045 -0.0114 0.0177** -0.0031
Specification
Constant -0.1935 -0.5147 -0.7893** -0.6984** -0.2228
Trend -0.0025 0.0061 -0.0059 -0.0091** -0.0032
Country dummies no no no no no
Time dummies no no no no no
AR(1) Process no no no no no
Lagged dependent variable no no no no no
Observations 261 262 262 262 240
R2 0.4976 0.3742 0.481 0.5286 0.4019
Legend:  * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
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D: Discussion of results 
 
The previous section established forcefully that regardless of the estimation method used, 
there are important differences between different types of ALMPs with respect to the 
significance, sign and magnitude. Differences in magnitude, provided that they are small, are 
not particularly problematic. If they are large, then relying on aggregate ALMPs may lead to 
infer a medium average effect whereas some programs are only marginally affected by the 
independent variable under consideration while it has large effects on others.  
Differences in the significance of coefficients for different dependent variables are quite 
important because then relying on aggregate ALMPs may mean we wrongly infer a significant 
relationship between two variables where there is in fact none or fail to identify a significant 
relationship which exists (that is there is a risk of both type I and type II errors). To get a 
bigger picture of what is going on with respect to the variation in significance of different 
coefficients depending on the regression, sixteen specifications were run (four methods across 
four different specifications, see appendix table A1). Note that the results of the first 
difference are not analysed because we are interested in the different impact of the 
independent variables on the levels of distinct ALMPs. 
 
Table 9 displays the type of regression that found coefficients to be significant. As an 
illustration, openness was not found to be significant for employment incentives in any of the 
specifications whereas it was found to be significant under specification C, D, H, K, and L for 
employment rehabilitation. The coefficients that were found to be significant at least once in 
each type of regression method (FGLS, PCSE with a lagged dependent variable, PCSE with 
an autoregressive process of order 1, and Robust clustered standard errors) are highlighted. 
This demonstrates unequivocally that there are important differences in what are significant 
determinants of different ALMPs. For instance, partisanship clearly has no impact on Direct 
Job Creation while it may be significantly related to employment incentives.  
 
However, this says nothing about the direction of the relation. Differences in signs are 
crucially important because they indicate different direction of causation which can then 
imply completely different theories underlying the changes in policies we observe. For 
instance, if higher union density leads to lower spending on one policy but to higher spending 
on another then this means that the degree of inclusiveness or strength that union density is 
supposed to proxy has different and even opposite effects on the different types of ALMPs. 
This then has important implications for the validity of studies of that specific case (i.e.: that 
rely on ALMPs and union density) but also for broader theories of which this is only a case 
(i.e.: for theories that do not rely on ALMPs but look at the effects of unions on policies such 
as revitalisation strategies). The same applies to the effect of partisanship which may for 
instance be different for employment incentives and direct job creation.  
 
To address this shortcoming we map the direction of causation for coefficient results 
which are found significant in each regression. This is presented in Table 10. The impact of 
openness on training is clearly negative, while it has no impact on Employment incentives, 
and ambiguous effects on the other ALMPs. Thus, previously conflicting results are partly 
driven by different dynamics within ALMPs (Training versus employment incentives) and 
may be the result of different regression methods yielding different results.  
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Table 9: Variation of coefficient significance under different methods. 
 
 
Deindustrialisation, where it is significant, has a positive relation with employment 
rehabilitation, direct job creation and Public Employment Services (PES), while the impact is 
ambiguous on training and only positively significant with two occasions for employment 
incentives. Partisanship has no significant relation with training or direct job creation and 
ambiguous effect on PES. The negative relation between partisanship and employment 
incentives imply that left leaning governments spend less on employment incentives than 
right wing governments. Union density has a positive effect on training under almost all 
specifications, while the sign is not stable for employment incentives and only few 
coefficients are significant for employment rehabilitation. The positive relation between 
density and direct job creation as well as PES is found in 7 out of the 16 specifications, 
providing mixed results. 
 
Wage coordination‟s positive impact on training represents the most significant finding of 
this paper as it has a positive impact under all specifications. In other words, the higher the 
degree of wage coordination, the higher the level of expenditures on training targeted at the 
unemployed. The positive relation is less consistent with direct job creation and employment 
incentives, and on the basis of these results one should doubt that wage coordination has any 
effect on employment rehabilitation or PES. The effect of Employment Protection 
Legislation which is key to the on-going theorisation of the insider-outsider model of labour 
market policy only has a significant effect on employment incentives and rehabilitation, but, 
in contradiction with Rueda‟s (2007) findings, the effect is positive not negative. Last but not 
least, unemployment does not have a consistent effect across different specifications but the 
existing results suggest that it is positively related to employment incentives and direct job 
creation and negatively related to employment rehabilitation.  
 
Training / GDP
Employment 
Incentives / GDP
Employment 
Rehabilitation / GDP
Direct Job Creation / 
GDP
Public Employment 
Services / GDP
Openness CDFHIJKLOP CDHKL CDEGKLOP ABCDEGKLN
Deindustrialisation CDEGL CD CDKLOP ACDIKOP CDKLOP
Left Government BEGIJKL AB ABE
Union density ABCDEFGHIJKLOP ABCDIKLOP CDKL ABEGIMN ABCDEGIJMN
Wage coordination ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOP ABEGHMN ABEG ABCDEFHKMOP
Employment Protection 
Legislation ABCDEFGHIJKP CDGKLOP CDGKLOP CD
Controls
GDP growth CDJL F ADEF EFGH AEFH
Deficit ABCDEFGHJMNOP ABCDIJKLN ABCDFIJKLOP ABCDEFGHIJKLMOP ABCDIJKLOP
Harmonised unemployment FH CDGL ACDEFHIKL CDKLOP ACD
Notes all types of estimations
a, b, c, d FGLS FE A,B,E,G,I,J,M,N
e,f,g,h OLS PCSE LDV RE C,D,F,H,K,L,O,P
i,j,k,l OLS PCSE AR1 TREND A,C,E,F,I,K,M,O
m,n,o,p RC CLUSTER TIME DUMMIES B,D,G,H,J,L,N,P
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Table 10: Direction of the relation between variables under different specifications 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Existing studies of the determinants of ALMPs have found sometimes quite different 
effects of key explanatory variables. However, the qualitative literature on activation processes 
underscores the distinctiveness of the determinants of different ALMPs. This paper 
questioned whether existing approaches relying on aggregate data on ALMPs are appropriate.  
 
Using different estimation methods and different specifications of the dependent 
variables I showed how the determinants of ALMPs identified in the literature review have 
different relations to different components of ALMPs. Indeed the magnitude, sign and 
significance of the coefficients varied significantly between different ALMPs. This result was 
robust to different estimation method and specification of the dependent variable. 
 
The analysis of the determinants of disaggregated ALMPs revealed some new insights 
which may partly reconcile previously contradictory results. First, variables are much more 
often significant overall in the model of spending on training than of other variables, which 
raises the question as to whether training is driving some of the results relying on aggregate 
ALMPs. Thus, other dynamics may be driving the cross national evolution of spending on 
other ALMPs and these remain to be fully investigated. 
 
Second, if partisanship matters at all, it suggests that right wing parties spend more on 
employment incentives than left wing parties. This conflicts with previous findings and is 
consistent with the position that traditional socialist parties in Europe as in France have taken 
towards certain activation processes.  Union density is positively related most clearly to 
training, in line with the contention that more inclusive unions will support policies that also 
favour the unemployed. The positive association between training and both direct job 
Training / GDP
Employment 
Incentives / GDP
Employment 
Rehabilitation / GDP
Direct Job Creation / 
GDP
Public Employment 
Services / GDP
Openness ---------- ++ - ++ ++--++++ -- ++ - ++ -
Deindustrialisation ++ -- + ++ +++++++ ++++++ ++++++
Left government ------ -- ++ - -
Union density ++++++++++++++ +++ - ++++ ++++ +++++++ +++++++
Wage coordination ++++++++++++++++ +++++++++ ++++ +++++++++++
Employment Protection 
Legislation -  ++ +++++++ ++++++++ ++
GDP growth ++++ - -- ---- ---
Deficit ------------- ---------- ----+-------- --------------- --------
Harmonised unemployment -- ++++ ---------- ++++++ ---
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creation as well as PES is consistent with revitalisation where unions support policies that 
may extend their membership base.  
 
Third, wage coordination is strongly positively related to training, and to a lesser extent to 
direct job creation and employment incentives (note that we do not count as strong results, 
those where the coefficients are not significant in at least four different regression methods - 
see Table 9). This is consistent with the notion that training, by raising the productivity of low 
skill unemployed workers, makes it possible to coordinate wages to a larger extent. Direct job 
creation might mechanically increase wage coordination by creating jobs in the public sector. 
Wage coordination may also mitigate the downwards wage effects that employment incentives 
may have on the reservation wage in the absence of coordination, which could be a potential 
explanation for the positive relation between wage coordination and employment incentives. 
 
Fourth, employment protection has no relation to training, direct job creation or PES. 
Where it is significant, it is positively related to employment incentives and employment 
rehabilitation. This contradicts the notion that employment protection of labour market 
insiders is negatively related to all types of ALMPs and opens the possibility that systems with 
higher employment protection also spend more on certain active measures. In other words, 
insiders‟ institutions may also benefit outsiders. 
 
Last but not least, deindustrialisation is not a strong explanation behind the training and 
employment incentives expenditures which represents in the period 1985-2007 more than 
50% of expenditures in Scandinavia and in the Southern clusters. Openness has a negative 
effect on training, no effect on employment incentives and a weak as well as ambiguous effect 
on other ALMPs. Thus, it is not contentious to conclude that at the very least, more open 
economies do not spend more on training. 
 
On the basis of these results, it is clear that relying on aggregate ALMPs as a dependent 
variable is potentially problematic and that analysing the interaction between different ALMPs 
and key explanatory variables may be a potentially valuable avenue for further research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 This paper benefited from valuable comments from participants at the Recwowe doctoral workshop in Menton 
(October 2010) and at the European Institute Lunch Seminars (November 2010). The author is particular 
grateful for feedback received from Bob Hancke, Marco Simoni, Giulano Bonoli, Vassilis Monastiriotis and Abel 
Bojar. 
 
2 Most often this includes a mixture of raising “work availability requirements”, “make work pay policies”, and 
increasing “employability” (see OECD website: 
http://www.oecd.org/document/5/0,3343,en_2649_33927_38938757_1_1_1_1,00.html 
 
3 For reason of parsimony, interaction effects between variables are not specifically considered. 
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4 Franzese and Hays (2006) only find it significant when ALMPs are weighted with unemployment but not when 
it is weighted with GDP. 
 
5 Subsequently the OECD has undertaken a harmonisation exercise to ensure its data collected prior to 1998 was 
consistent with the new classification. 
 
6 Country and time dummies are not present in all specification as we run both random and fixed effects as well 
as time dummies and a trend, depending on the specification 
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Appendix 
 
 
Table A1: List of model specifications and estimation method 
 
Code Estimation method: fixed versus random effects and trend versus time dummies. 
A Feasible Generalised Least Squares, Fixed Effects, trend 
B Feasible Generalised Least Squares, Fixed Effects, time dummies 
C Feasible Generalised Least Squares, Random Effects, trend 
D Feasible Generalised Least Squares, Random Effects,  time dummies 
E Panel Corrected Standard Errors, Lagged dependent variable, Fixed Effects, trend 
F Panel Corrected Standard Errors, Lagged dependent variable, Random Effects, trend 
G Panel Corrected Standard Errors, Lagged dependent variable, Fixed Effects, time dummies 
H Panel Corrected Standard Errors, Lagged dependent variable, Random Effects, time dummies 
I Panel Corrected Standard Errors, Autoregressive process (1), Fixed Effects, trend 
J Panel Corrected Standard Errors, Autoregressive process (1), Fixed Effects, time dummies 
K Panel Corrected Standard Errors, Autoregressive process (1), Random Effects, trend 
L Panel Corrected Standard Errors, Autoregressive process (1), Random Effects, time dummies 
M Robust clustered standard errors - Fixed Effects, trend 
N Robust clustered standard errors - Fixed Effects, time dummies 
O Robust clustered standard errors - Random Effects, trend 
P Robust clustered standard errors - Random Effects, time dummies 
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